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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-ImNUNITY:

FiFTH

AMENDMENT

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION ECLIPSED BY USE

PRIVILEGE

IMMUNITY-Kastigar

v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Kastigar refused to answer questions during federal grand jury proceedings despite an order1 commanding him to answer and granting
him use and derivative use immunity, protecting him from the use of

his testimony or any evidence derived from it.2 Kastigar's refusal to
testify was premised on the theory that the grant of immunity ex-

tended to him was constitutionally deficient and that only transactional immunity3 could supplant his fifth amendment privilege. The

trial court found Kastigar in civil contempt and ordered him confined
pursuant to section 301(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sus-

tained the contempt conviction, holding that the immunity statute was
constitutional. 5 In the Supreme Court, Kastigar argued that under the
fifth amendment no immunity statute, however drawn, could be con-

stitutional, further contending that even if a constitutional immunity
statute could be drafted, no immunity less comprehensive than transactional immunity could supplant the fifth amendment privilege

against self-incrimination. Affirming Kastigar's contempt conviction,
the Supreme Court held that since "use and derivative use" immunity
leaves the witness in substantially the same position as if he had

1. The order was issued purguant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), which provides that
when a witness is compelled by district court order to testify over a claim of the privilege:
[T] he witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
2. Use and derivative use immunity allows subsequent prosecution for the offense
to which the compelled testimony relates. However, in theory, neither the testimony nor
fruits thereof are admissible as evidence in the subsequent prosecution.
3. Transactional immunity proscribes prosecution for any "transaction, matter or
thing" to which the compelled testimony relates. This language was used in the first
immunity statute which the Court allowed to stand: Act of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat.
443 (repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 245,
84 Stat. 931).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970), entitled "Recalcitrant Witnesses."
5. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom.
Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
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claimed the fifth amendment privilege, it suffices to supplant that privilege. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).6
The Court's opinion in Kastigar is regrettable for three reasons.
First, the Kastigar rationale is supported neither in logic nor by controlling precedent. Second, the statute approved by the Court will not,
in practice, afford a witness protections coextensive with the fifth
amendment privilege. Finally, by approving this lesser degree of immunity, the Court may have lessened the value of immunity statutes in
combatting organized crime.
I.

THE JUDICIAL BASIS OF IMMUNITY STATUTES

An important tool of effective law enforcement has been the prosecutor's statutory authority7 to grant a witness immunity in order to
compel his testimony over a claim of the fifth amendment privilege.
This technique has proven to be the only lawful way in which a prosecutor may circumvent the witness' privilege against self-incrimination.
Traditionally it was thought that nothing short of complete immunity
from prosecution was constitutionally permissible, and thus most of
the immunity statutes granted transactional immunity.8 As a result of
Kastigar'sill-reasoned approval of a lesser degree of immunity, it can
now be anticipated that immunity legislation will provide for "use and
derivative use" immunity. Kastigaris the fifth principal case in which
the Court has developed and expanded the immunity principle, and
the decision relies primarily, and in some instances unjustifiably, on
the previous four.9
The Court's first test of the immunity principle was in Counselman
6. Two dissenting opinions were filed, and Justices Brennan and Rehnquist took no
part in consideration or decision. Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the precedents relied upon by the Court were misconstrued and improperly applied, and that the
intent of the framers of the fifth amendment was to "put it beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes." 406 U.S. at 467. Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued that nothing less than transactional immunity would leave the witness in
"precisely the same position, vis-h-vis the government.., as he would have been in had
he remained silent in reliance on the privilege," because the "safeguards" associated
with lesser degrees of immunity are, in practice, ineffective. Id. at 468.
7. For a history of the various federal immunity statutes, see Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the ConstitutionalTightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).

8. See note 3 supra. See also Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C. § 3486
(Supp. 11 1970), pertinent portions of which appear in Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 423-24 (1956), discussed in text accompanying note 19 infra.
9. See notes 47-55 and accompanying text infra.
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v. Hitchcock.'0 There the Court examined an immunity statute which
proscribed only the direct use of the compelled testimony in a subsequent criminal prosecution with no proscription on utilization of the
fruits of that testimony." The Court found this "bare use" statute to
be unconstitutional because the "protection of... [the statute] is not
coextensive with the privilege [against self-incrimination] .,12 The
opinion included dicta that an immunity statute which grants absolute
immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates would be coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege.' 3 Within weeks of the opinion, a statute affording transactional
immunity was before Congress, and in Brown v. Walker' 4 the Court
in dictum sustained the constitutionality of the statute, while resting its
holding on the narrow ground that the fifth amendment privilege operates only to protect one from self-incrimination in a criminal sense,
providing no protection from exposure to social disgrace, dishonor or
obloquy. 15 The decision turned principally on the Court's judgment
that Brown was unlikely to be prosecuted for the transactions about
which he testified, even had he been granted no immunity, 16 which led
the Court to conclude that Brown could not be considered to be a
witness against himself.' 7 The Brown opinion thus did not explicitly
consider the proposition that transactional immunity is coextensive
with the fifth amendment privilege and may supplant it. However, the
fact that Brown did not strike down the statute has led the courts to
cite Brown in support of this proposition.' 8 This reading of Brown
was not seriously challenged for sixty years.
In Ullmann v. United States' 9 the petitioner had been granted
10. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
11. This type of immunity will be designated herein as "bare use" immunity.
12.

142 U.S. at 565.

13.

Id.at 586.

14.

15.

161 U.S. 591 (1896).

Brown, the auditor of a railway company, was subpoenaed before a grand jury

to testify concerning the company's alleged violations of the Interstate Commerce Act.

He refused to answer questions concerning rebates on the basis of his fifth amendment
privilege, despite the fact that transactional immunity was afforded him pursuant to the
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443. Brown was adjudged in contempt. On appeal the
Supreme Court upheld his contempt conviction, noting that Brown was not the principal, or even a substantial offender, and implying that the privilege had been invoked to
protect the railway company and its officers.
16. 161U.S. at 609.
17. Id.at 604.
18. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
19.

350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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transactional immunity but refused to testify before a grand jury.
Ullmann contested the constitutionality of immunity statutes in general and sought to distinguish his case from Brown by pointing out
that, although he would not be subject to criminal penalties as a result
of his testimony, his admission of his Communist affiliations would
lead to actual penalties "such as loss of job, explusion from labor
unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility . . ,,0 The Ullmann Court disposed of the issue by reaffirming
Brown, refusing to consider the distinctions Ullmann raised. 2 1 Thus
Ullmann has been cited for reaffirming the proposition that immunity
coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege can supplant the privi22
lege.
Until 1964 there was little doubt that constitutionally permissible
23
immunity statutes must afford absolute immunity from prosecution,
since neither Brown nor Ullmann even hinted that some degree
of immunity less than transactional immunity also might be sufficient.
However, in that year the Court rendered its decision
in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,2 4 which some courts
believed held use and derivative use immunity to be a constitutionally
permissible alternative to transactional immunity.2 5
Murphy was decided in a different jurisdictional context than either
20. Id. at 430.
21. Id.at431,438-39.
22. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964),
discussed at note 24 and accompanying text infra.
23. But see Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954) where the Court allowed a
bare use immunity statute to stand. The Court felt that to hold the statute unconstitutional would allow the state to convict Adams solely on the basis of his federally compelled testimony since Adams had not invoked his fifth amendment privilege in the federal proceeding. The Court reasoned:
[A] witness does not need any statute to protect him from the use of selfincriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth
Amendment takes care of that without a statute. Consequently, the construction
of . . . [the statute] here urged would limit its protection to that already
afforded by the Fifth Amendment, leaving the Section with no effect whatever.
We reject the contention that Adams' failure to claim a constitutional privilege
deprived him of the statutory protection of . . . [the statute].
347 U.S. at 181. The Court thus did not have to determine whether the failure of the
statute to afford complete transactional immunity was fatal.
24. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Murphy and others had refused to testify before the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor which was investigating work stoppages. The
Commission then granted transactionalimmunity under state laws, but Murphy again
refused to testify on the grounds that his testimony would tend to incriminate him under
federal law, and that state immunity laws would not protect him from federal prosecution.
25. See note 35 infra.
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Brown or Ullmann. Murphy had been granted transactional immunity
under state laws but refused to testify on the grounds that his testimony would tend to incriminate him under federal law, claiming that
26
state immunity laws would not protect him from federal prosecution.
The Court first recognized that prior to Murphy's companion case,
Malloy v. Hogan,27 the Constitution was interpreted to allow the ad28
mission of state compelled testimony as evidence in federal courts.
However, since Malloy had made the fifth amendment uniformly
applicable to both federal and state jurisdictions, the Court felt that a
rule which allowed "whipsawing" a witness between jurisdictions in
29
order to defeat his fifth amendment privilege should be reconsidered.
After examining the policies and purposes underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court rejected the existing rule, holding
that the witness must be assured of protection under both federal and
30
state jurisdictions before his testimony can be compelled.
The Court previously had noted the effect which the supremacy
31
clause had upon a state law:
No one would suggest that state law could prevent a proper federal
investigation; the Court... [has] already held that the Federal Government could, under the Supremacy Clause, grant immunity from
state prosecution, and that, accordingly, state law could not prevent a
proper investigation.
Thus it was clear that the Court need not analyze the effect which a,
grant of immunity under federal law would have upon the states; it
would bind them. However, it was equally clear that a grant of transactional immunity under a state law could not absolutely bar federal
prosecution, and in the words of the Court, "We must now decide what
effect this holding has on existing state immunity legislation. ' 3 2 Since
a state grant of transactional immunity could not under the supremacy
26.

378 U.S. at 53-54.

27.

378 U.S. 1 (1964).

28. The Court noted:
Knapp v.Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, held that a State could compel a witness to give
testimony which might incriminate him under federal law; and Feldman v. United
States, 233 U.S. 487, held that testimony thus compelled by a State could be introduced into evidence in the federal courts.
378 U.S. at 57.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 77-78.
31. Id.at 71.
32. Id.at 78.
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clause bind the federal government to that degree of immunity, the
Court determined that the federal government at least must be bound
by use and derivative use immunity to enable a state constitutionally
33
to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege:
[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may
be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and
its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
In arriving at this holding, the Murphy Court quoted selected dicta
from Counselman apparently supporting the inference that use and
derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient for any jurisdiction to compel testimony over a claim of the fifth amendment privilege. 34 This has led several courts to express the opinion that Murphy
overruled the Counselman transactional formula sub silentio.35 In the
context of the entire Murphy opinion, however, the better interpretation is that the Court intended that there be a dichotomy of standards
between federal and state jurisdictions when the testimony was com36
pelled under state law.
In October of 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control
Act, 37 designed to stem the growing impact of organized crime. In
33. Id. at 79.
34. In describing its concept of use and derivative use immunity, the Murphy Court
quoted dicta from Counselman which pointed out one shortcoming in the bare use
immunity statute:
[It] could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other
testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding in such court . . . . 142 U.S. at 564.
id. at 78.
35. See Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1969); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d
129 (1970), aff'd, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) (companion case to Kastigar); People v. La
Bello, 24 N.Y.2d 598, 249 N.E.2d 412, 301 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1969). But see United
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Steven v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); In re Kinoy, 326 F.
Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
36. This dichotomy of standards, whereby the state is required to grant transactional
immunity in order to compel testimony while the federal authorities need only grant use
and derivative use immunity to state compelled testimony, is a necessary corrollary to
the supremacy clause. In the interjurisdictional situation, if the federal government were
required to grant federal transactional immunity to a state witness while leaving the
state in control of the taking of testimony, the scope of the questions might exceed federal expectations, permitting the state to grant the state witness a greater federal immunity than otherwise desired by the federal government, clearly in contravention of
the supremacy clause. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
37. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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this act, upon the recommendations of the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 38 Congress abandoned the "transactional" standard of immunity in favor of a "use and derivative use"
standard.3 9 This new standard was approved by the Court in Kastigar.
II.

THE KASTIGAR RATIONALE

Reasoning from the major premise that statutory immunity of a
scope coextensive with the fifth amendment- privilege may supplant
the privilege4" and the minor premise that use and derivative use
immunity is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, 41 the Kastigar Court concluded that a statute providing use-derivative use
immunity may supplant the fifth amendment privilege.4
The Court quickly dispensed with its major premise by reaffirming
Brown and Ullmann.43 The Court also quoted Counselman dicta to
support Kastigar'smajor premise, 44 briefly alluding to the necessity of
allowing immunity statutes to supplant the fifth amendment privilege. 45 Although Brown does not specifically support the premise that
statutory immunity coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege
may supplant it4 6 the premise is basically a sound one and was approved in Ullmann. For the purposes of this note, Kastigar's major
premise will be considered valid.
In support of its minor premise that use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege, the Court
47
relies primarily on Murphy:
38.

See

NAT'L COMM. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIM. LAWS, WORKING PAPERS

1405-48

[hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
39. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), the text of which is quoted in note I supra.
40. The KastigarCourt stated:
[U] nder the principle that a grant of immunity cannot supplant the privilege, and
is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege, unless the scope
of the grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege ....
406 U.S. at 450.

41. The Court stated: "We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination ..... Id. at 453.
42. The opinion concluded: "The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege and suffices to supplant it." Id. at 462.
43. Id. at 448.
44. Id. at 450 n.30.
45. Id. at 446-47.
46. See notes 14-18 and accompanying textsupra.
47. 406 U.S. at 458. For additional support Mr. Justice Powell relied on Counselman and WORKING PAPERS, supra note 38. These Working Papers, which the Court
referred to only in a footnote (Id. at 452 n.36), were prepared as support for the recom-
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[B] oth the reasoning of the Court in Murphy and the result reached
compel the conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
However, a careful reading of the Murphy opinion reveals that Murphy does not bear out the Court's conclusion. Unlike the Murphy Court,
the Kastigar Court was not dealing with a conflict between the supremacy clause and the fifth amendment privilege but with the constitutional sufficiency of use and derivative use immunity granted by the
jurisdiction compelling the testimony. Murphy had announced that
when a state compels testimony in exchange for a grant of transactional immunity, federal prosecutorial authorities are proscribed from
using the testimony or fruits thereof in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 48 In support of this holding, Murphy relied solely on selected
dicta from Counselman,49 completely ignoring other Counselman
50
dicta which indicate that a higher form of immunity is required.
This was necessary for the Murphy Court because the supremacy
clause would not permit subscription to a higher degree of immunity
in the state-federal interjurisdictional situation. 5 1 Since the Murphy
result is distinguishable from Kastigar and the Murphy Court used
Counselman as its only authority, Counselman must be the real author52
ity upon which Kastigaris predicated.
From its analysis of Counselman, the Kastigar Court concluded
that an immunity statute providing for use and derivative use immunity is constitutional, based upon a negative inference drawn from
a statement that an immunity statute lacking derivative use immunity
is unconstitutional. However, the logic of that analysis is flawed by its
assumption that in Counselman the lack of derivative use immunity
was the only constitutional objection to that statute. On the contrary,
the Court in Counselman objected to the immunity statute before it
53
principally because:
mended model legislation submitted to Congress. The recommendation served as a
model for the Federal Witness Immunity Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), which was at
issue in Kastigar.
48. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
49. 378 U.S. at 78-79. For a sample of the Counselman language upon which
Murphy relied, see text accompanying note 54 infra.
50. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
5 1. See note 31 and accompanying text supra;see also note 36 supra.
52. Kastigar does place some reliance on selected Counselman dicta, but looks to
Murphy for its primary support.
53.
142U.S. at 585.
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[N] o statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the
United States.
The Counselman opinion included in the same paragraph the dicta
54
which the Court in Kastigar relied upon as its "conceptual basis":
[The statute], moreover, affords no protection against that use of
compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge
of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may
supply other means of convicting the witness or party.
Thus the Court in Kastigar incorrectly inferred from Counselman that
the addition of a derivative use immunity provision would have saved
that statute from fifth amendment objection. The Court apparently
recognized the logical invalidity of reliance on Counselman and
55
sought to overcome this by placing principal reliance on Murphy,
further obscuring the weakness of the argument by labeling selected
dicta from Counselman as the "conceptual basis"5 6 of the Counselman decision.
Thus the Kastigar opinion stands on shaky analytical ground. The
minor premise upon which its holding rests is supported neither by
logical analysis nor controlling precedent. However, the Supreme
Court is bound by neither logic nor precedent, and Kastigar is now
the law. Thus, it is important to examine the wisdom and efficacy of
the Court's holding.
III.

THE SHIFTING BURDEN OF PROOFA SUBSTANTIAL PROTECTION?

The Court in Kastigar held that a defendant who raises a claim of
immunity establishes a prima facie case for excluding the government's evidence upon showing that he has previously testified under a
grant of immunity. 57 Such a showing raises a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the defendant and shifts the burden to the government to
54.

Id. at 586.

55.

See note 47 and accompanying text supra.

56. "Our holding is consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman." 406 U.S.
at 453.
57. Id. at 460.
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prove that all evidence it intends to introduce was obtained from legitimate sources unrelated to the prior immunized testimony of the defendant. 58 This use and derivative use immunity sanctioned by the
Court in Kastigar, though much narrower in scope than the transactional immunity approved in Brown, was deemed "substantial protection"5 9 for the criminal defendant's fifth amendment rights. Analysis
does not confirm the Court's conclusion.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed, "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 60 The Court's experience with the
exclusionary rule in fourth amendment wiretapping cases 61 provides
a valuable analogy to the exclusionary features of the use immunity
statute approved in Kastigar. These fourth amendment cases contain
all of the elements likely to appear in prosecutions subsequent to
grants of use and derivative use immunity: an exclusionary rule, a
"taint" determination, and a shifting of the burden of persuasion. All
of the problems associated with the application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule are certain to arise in immunity cases, and the
analogy unfortunately shows that the exclusionary rule offers little
viable protection to the accused.
In Alderman v. United States62 the Court delineated the scope of
the procedural safeguards associated with the exclusionary rule where
fourth amendment rights had been infringed. 63 After his conspiracy
conviction, Alderman had learned that illegally obtained electronic
surveillance transcripts may have provided the government with leads
for gaining evidence used in his prosecution. The government admitted having the ill-gotten transcripts but denied using this inadmissible evidence either directly or indirectly in Alderman's prosecution.
The Court concluded that when some of the government's evidence
may be subject to exclusion as "fruit of the poisonous tree," the defendant is entitled to disclosure of its source if he can demonstrate
58. Id. at 461-62.
59. Id.at461.
60. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
61. See, e.g., Karabian, The Case Against Wiretapping, I PAC. L.J. 133 (1970);
Little, The Exclusionary Rule of Evidence as a Means of Enforcing Fourth Amendment Morality on Police, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 375 (1970).
62. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).

63. "The exclusionary rule . . . excludes from a criminal trial any evidence
seized from the defendant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Fruits of
such evidence are excluded as well." 394 U.S. at 171. In immunity cases the exclusionary rule will apply to the "compelled testimony and its fruits." Murphy,
378 U.S. at 79.
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standing. The defendant then "must go forward with specific evidence
demonstrating taint," 64 after which the burden shifts to the government to show either: (1) that the evidence was derived from totally
independent sources, or (2) that although dependent sources were involved, the connection between the evidence and the compelled testi'65
mony has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.
The problem facing the defendant is one of establishing the relationship between his overheard conversations and the government's
probative evidence. The present rules of criminal discovery do not
entitle the defendant to examine the government's investigative files,
thereby prohibiting examination of the one source most likely to reveal whether or not the evidence is "tainted.16 6 Hence, the accused in
wiretapping cases is faced with the almost impossible task of discovering leads from the surveillance transcripts which might have been
used in building a case against him, without the benefit of examining
the government's investigative files. On the other hand, the government has total access to the ill-gotten electronic surveillance and its
own investigative files. Where testimony is compelled under use immunity statutes, standing to object to the evidence introduced in any
subsequent prosecution will be conferred when the defendant shows
6
he has testified concerning the offense under a grant of immunity. r
Only then will the defendant be entitled to disclosure of his compelled
testimony, and in an adversary hearing the government will have the
burden of proving that the evidence is not subject to the exclusionary
rule. However, as Mr. Justice Marshall observed, dissenting in Kasti68
gar,
64.

394 U.S. at 183.

65.

The doctrine of attenuation was developed in Nardone v. United States, 308

U.S. 338 (1939). In the words of the Court:

Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of
good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissi-

pate the taint.
Id. at 341. The attenuation determination is left to the sole discretion of the trial judge.

66.
Even in federal courts where liberal discovery is generally allowed, the defendant is unable to discover investigative files. See, e.g., the limiting language in FED.
R. CusM. P. 16(b):
[T] his rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda,
or other internal government documents made by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by
government witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other than defendant)
to agents of the government.
67. 406 U.S. at 461-62.
68. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

721

Washington Law Review

Vol. 48: 711, 1973

[T] hough the Court puts the burden of proof on the government, the
government will have no difficulty in meeting its burden by mere assertion if the witness produces no contrary evidence.
The defendant subject to the immunity statute will encounter the
same monumental task as the defendant in the wiretap cases, for he
will be armed only with the transcript of his compelled testimony.6 9
In cross-examining government investigators, the defendant will be
forced to undertake what is likely to be an unsuccessful fishing expedition in the hope of establishing a relationship between the government's probative evidence and his own compelled testimony. If the
defendant makes no specific allegations concerning portions of the
government's evidence, the government need merely assert that those
portions were independently obtained. For those pieces of evidence
about which the defendant makes specific allegations, the government
may either show an independent source or argue that the relationship
is so slight that the attenuation doctrine allows their admissibility.70
Without access to the government's investigative files, the defendant
cannot hope to overcome the prosecution's arguments. Thus as Justice
71
Marshall aptly points out in dissent:
The Court today sets out a loose net to trap tainted evidence and prevent its use against the witness, but it accepts an intolerably great risk
that tainted evidence will in fact slip through that net.
The rule advanced in Kastigar cannot begin to leave the witness
and the prosecutorial authorities in the same position as if the witness
had invoked his fifth amendment privilege. Unless the Court allows
the defendant full discovery of government investigative files and totally eliminates the "attenuation doctrine," a witness whose testimony
is compelled under a grant of "use and derivative use" immunity may
well be convicting himself in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
IV.

A QUESTION OF EFFICACY

Pragmatically, the Court should have considered whether the gen69. Neither the Kastigar opinion nor 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1970) provides for
more liberal discovery in immunity cases. The defendant will be subject to FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(b), supra note 66.
70. The doctrine of attenuation applies to all exclusionary rules. For the current
status of this doctrine, see generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
71. 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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eral purpose of immunity statutes would be enhanced by a change
from "transactional" to "derivative use" immunity. In Kastigar the
Court implies72 that the purpose of an immunity statute is to obtain
information needed to arrest criminal activity which is unlikely to be
obtained by other means. However, the replacement of "transactionar' immunity with "derivative use" immunity may vitiate the
utility of the immunity device. Ironically, the more heinous the type of
crime investigated, the more likely that a contempt citation or a perjury conviction would seem preferable to a guilty witness when compared with the possibility of a subsequent prosecution for serious
crimes closely related to those adverted to in the compelled testimony.73
If such a witness does testify, his testimony is likely to add up to "I
don't know anything" if there is a possibility the evidence may be used
in a related prosecution. On the other hand, transactional immunity is
more likely to produce the desired information because the witness
may rest assured that he will not be prosecuted for crimes in any way
related to those about which he testifies.
Substituting derivative use immunity for transactional immunity is
likely to cause less information to be gained and correspondingly
fewer central figures in organized crime to be convicted. This loss will
be poorly compensated by a probable increase in prosecutions of the
more visible participants in organized crime, since many of the prosecutions will be for perjury or contempt rather than for substantive
criminal offenses.
CONCLUSION
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Powell, has rendered an
unfortunate opinion in Kastigar.First, justification for Kastigar'srationale is grounded in prior Supreme Court opinions which on close
analysis do not sustain the Court's interpretation of them. Second, the
operative effect of the use and derivative use immunity statute approved in Kastigar will result in an erosion of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, particularly since present rules for
discovery in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure deny an objecting defendant access to the prosecutor's investigatory files, thereby
72.

Id. at 466-67.

73. With particular reference to organized crime, the witness already has enough to
fear in underworld retaliation.
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eliminating the only realistic opportunity to contest the government's
assertion that its evidence was gained without taint.
Finally, even law enforcement seems poorly served by Kastigar.
The probable consequence of replacing the broader transactional
immunity with use and derivative use immunity will be to encourage
perjury or outright refusal to testify, with this tendency increasing in
proportion to the seriousness of the crimes investigated. Where undetectable but effective derivative use of compelled testimony is a distinct possibility, the risk of a contempt or perjury conviction may
appear a better gamble than the risk of conviction for a much more
serious substantive criminal offense. By not forcing the witness to
encounter this concern, transactional immunity makes him more
likely to testify truthfully.
Regrettably the Kastigar Court's narrowing of the scope of immunity required to compel testimony over a claim of the fifth amendment privilege has both eroded the privilege against self-incrimination
and weakened the value of immunity statutes as tools in the fight
against serious crime.
W.J.M.
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